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Halted Democracy: Government 
Hijacking of the New Opposition 
in Azerbaijan
Altay Goyushov and Ilkin Huseynli
The unprecedented government crackdown against its critics started on the eve 
of the 2013 presidential elections which effectively halted the democratization 
process and caused a general pessimism in the society. Despite the high level of 
youth activism, Ilham Aliyev won a third term as president in 2013. In addition to 
the defeat of the opposition, since then, the government of Azerbaijan has become 
more authoritarian and the political sphere of the opposition has successfully 
been narrowed down to social media. However, due to the misguided view that 
anything other than the defeat of the ruling party should be considered a failure 
for the opponents of the government, achievements of the youth activism in Azer-
baijan between 2005 and 2013 have been overlooked while their contributions to 
the Azerbaijani society have been ignored. This article examines the activities of 
the independent youth organizations in the country, which emerged after the seri-
ous setback of the opposition political parties in the 2005 parliamentary elections.
Two events had caused a heated political debate among the opponents of 
the government concerning the reasons of their failures. First, in 2003, after the 
death of the then president Heydar Aliyev, the opposition had a good chance to 
grasp the power. But due to the falsification of the electoral results as well as the 
oppression of the protests, Ilham Aliyev managed to succeed his father.
Second, after two years, the Azerbaijani united opposition, influenced by 
the then recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, failed to galvanize the 
masses behind itself and lost the parliamentary elections to the ruling party. 
After these unsuccessful attempts of changing the government, the opposition-
minded people, including some writers, journalists, lawyers, and public figures, 
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questioned the strategy of the traditional opposition parties, namely Musavat 
and the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party (APFP), by arguing that apart from the 
oppressive nature of the government other reasons contributed to the failure of 
democratization as well.
Many of them argued that traditions and habits of Azerbaijanis, such as patri-
archal values, enabled the government to manipulate the elections and to legiti-
mize authoritarianism. Some others blamed the traditional opposition for lacking 
clarity in their ideas and messages of change and casted doubts on loyalty of 
traditional opposition to basic principles of liberal democracy. They also criti-
cized the leading figures of traditional opposition for failure to lead by example 
in regard of their personal integrity and thus to convince the public that they are 
somehow different from their rivals in the government. So, for this emerging 
trend along with outdated traditions the old opposition was regarded as populist 
and as another bulwark of ideas and habits hindering modernization. In their turn, 
the traditional opposition continued to insist that the only obstacle to democrati-
zation remains the oppressive nature of the government rather than the traditions 
of the Azerbaijani people.
In other words, while the first group or what we call the new opposition 
insisted that some outdated traditions of the Azerbaijani society as well as the 
inability of traditional opposition parties were among the important reasons 
of failing democratization, the second group, that is the traditional opposition, 
maintained its view that the people supported democracy and it was the victim of 
the authoritarian government.
While the traditional opposition refers to the Musavat Party and the APPF, 
which were in power for a year till 1993, the new opposition needs to be clari-
fied. By new opposition we mean independent organizations established by writ-
ers, students, and social activist in order to educate the public and create a new 
sphere for public debates. In the length of this article, we cover the activities of 
Azad Yazarlar Ocağı (AYO—Union of Independent Writers), AN Network (AN 
şəbəkəsi) and its project Kapellhaus Lectures, OL! Azerbaijani Youth Move-
ment and its project Azad Fikir Universiteti (AFU—Free Thought University), 
Dalğa Movement, and Nida Civic Movement. We discuss the different strate-
gies of these youth organizations and trace their effects till today. Other than the 
abovementioned independent youth organizations, we also discuss how the gov-
ernment tried to hijack this idea by creating its own conservative and pro-gov-
ernment youth organization İrəli Public Union of which name is taken from the 
campaign slogan of Ilham Aliyev (İlhamla irəli—forward with Ilham). While the 
new opposition focused on topics such as democratic institutions, free speech, 
social justice, societal pressures on the youth, religion, sexuality, gender, and 
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to some extent political theories, the pro-government organizations preferred to 
stay within the boundaries of Azerbaijani conservativism and instead of debating 
taboos, they focused on patriotism, militarism, solidarity, achievements of Hey-
dar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev, business opportunities for the youth, organizing 
art galleries, and at best, mild criticism of Azerbaijani society and in some rare 
instances the government policies.
In this article, we argue that while the new opposition between 2005 and 2013 
did not realized all the goals set, it influenced a new generation of young activists 
who became the loudest supporters of democratic and secular values in Azerbai-
jan. This grassroots activation of the youth brought noticeable changes to some 
parts of the Azerbaijani society by questioning the authority of traditional values. 
Many young people, especially students found a platform to discuss their prob-
lems concerning everyday basic issues such as intimate relationships as well as 
their freedom to live in accordance with their personal choices and desires without 
the family interference in the light of theoretical questions such as the importance 
of liberal democratic values, individual liberties, and the rule of law. The success-
fully established connections between material problems and transcendental ideals 
encouraged some young people to participate in the open discussions and seminars 
organized by the new opposition. Because of the emergence of this new generation 
of active youth, the government was forced to incorporate some elements of this 
new discourse at least by making some cosmetic changes within its structures. The 
government became successful in its attempts of weakening the new opposition by 
hijacking its ideas and creating similar but pro-government organizations; neutral-
izing or “buying” some well-known opposition figures such as writers and journal-
ists; and finally, persecuting the leading members of the youth organizations.
In the following sections, first, we give a background of the political devel-
opments in Azerbaijan since the year 2005 when the unified traditional opposi-
tion tried to challenge the government in legislative elections. Second, we give 
a descriptive account of the emergence of youth organizations and the rationale 
behind the activism of the then new generation between 2005 and 2013 mainly 
based on our interviews with key public figures.1 Then we discuss the reaction of 
the government to these new developments and the attempt of the ruling elite to 
hijack and transform the discourses of the new opposition by various methods. 
Finally, we discuss the positive effects of the new opposition on the Azerbaijani 
society as well as its shortcomings.
1In the preparation of this article, we greatly appreciate the contributions of Ali S. Novruzov 
and Rashadat Akhundov.
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Political Developments
In 2005 two main opposition parties namely Musavat and the APFP put their long 
rivalry aside and by uniting almost all opposition forces behind them entered 
the parliamentary elections with their main competitor being the ruling Yeni 
Azərbaycan (YAP—New Azerbaijan) party. However, their bid once more was 
lost due to failure to mobilize enough public support to oppose falsification of 
elections by ruling regime (Kassa 2012). In general, it was a serious blow to tra-
ditional opposition parties which were primary forces opposing the further con-
solidation of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan. And as a result of this, in 2008, the 
weakened and effectively sidelined traditional opposition parties boycotted the 
presidential elections citing the longstanding obstacles and the lack of necessary 
conditions for free and fair elections (Isler Beguin 2008). In addition to its suf-
fering from heavy-handed rule of Aliyev’s power and material disadvantages, the 
traditional opposition entered a prolonged stage of ideological bankruptcy. As 
Thomas de Wall, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe, pointed out “The old, main 
Azerbaijani opposition parties, Musavat and the [Popular] Front, which briefly 
governed the country in 1992-93, have little to offer the public and live off past 
glories. Indeed, for President Aliyev they are a useful contrast to his own regime, 
which, the public has been told, may have deviated from democracy but has 
brought prosperity and stability instead” (de Waal 2018).
Emerged in late 1980s and seizing power in 1992 for one-year rule of the 
country the APFP and Musavat were undoubtedly more democratic in compari-
son with their main opponent—the ruling YAP, which established and run by old 
soviet elite. However, dubbed as “national democrats” and dominated mainly 
by ethno-nationalist forces, these two opposition parties stagnated and subse-
quently lost their ideological as well as intellectual superiority over the ruling 
YAP, which transformed itself into a new style nationalist organization. Domi-
nated by old soviet guard, YAP gradually acquired the nationalistic tone of its 
rivals, that is, those two oppositional parties, and effectively sidelined them in 
this discourse. The ruling party emerged even more progressive in comparison 
with the opposition in terms of its ideology due to the replacement of chauvinis-
tic ethno- nationalism of the latter with state-civic nationalism. In this regard, the 
only remained point of these oppositional forces in which they still had higher 
moral voice was their appeal to democratization. Yet, neither of them was particu-
larly democratic in organizational or ideological terms. As a result, they had been 
struggling to win the public support for their cause.
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In its turn, the ruling party, triumphed and emboldened by flowing into the 
country billions of oil money, did not stop after “winning” presidential elections 
in 2008 and planned a referendum for the next year, which would lift the two 
term limit for the then incumbent Aliyev to run for the third time. In the course 
of preparation for the referendum, the government shut down broadcasting of 
VOA, RFE/RL, and BBC Azeri on FM waves, which were the last remnants of 
independent information sources within the country (BBG 2018). By then, TV 
stations had already been under complete monopoly of the ruling regime. Inde-
pendent and oppositional print media were crippled due to the longstanding pres-
sure of the government and they barely existed with remaining couple of outlets 
having very small circulation (Democracy Monitor 2007). As a result, nearly 
unchallenged monopoly and control over the flow of information was established 
by the government. Almost no space left for the opposition parties to discuss and 
express their opinions on the referendum. Therefore, while meeting little resist-
ance from public and opposition, the government crossed another milestone in the 
transformation of the country into the consolidated authoritarianism. The refer-
endum in 2009 paved the way for Ilham Aliyev to be elected the head of state for 
the third time in a row.
However, then in late 2009 and early 2010, a dramatic turn of events due to 
the mainly three developments in both world and local stage caused serious prob-
lems for the government to proceed with its plans and forced the elite to resort 
to the unprecedented and internationally well-documented repressions (Amnesty 
International 2015; IMS 2015; HRW 2016). These events, which challenged the 
authoritarian rule, were popularization of social networks; activities of various 
youth organizations entering public and political life of the country; and the Arab 
Spring, which seriously frightened the government. Although eventually the gov-
ernment was successful in implementation of its plans and halted the democrati-
zation process (at least for the time being) with its heavy-handed response, it still 
suffered from significant setbacks, too. Repressions turned the attention of world-
wide media and human rights organizations to the increasingly oppressive nature 
of the regime and its corrupt dealings. Sensible for its image abroad Azerbaijani 
ruling elite was frustrated due to this extensive of coverage of its repressions and 
corruption.
Since the late 2009 early 2010 Facebook, by becoming the most powerful 
social platform in the country, opened a free space for public discussions. Since 
the mainstream media outlets are under the control of the government, only social 
media give opportunity for opposition-minded individuals to speak their mind. 
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In this respect, social media, especially Facebook is crucial for the critics of the 
government in terms of visibility and popularity; however, the benefits “also 
increases the likelihood of repercussions” (Pearce and Guliyev 2015, p. 239). 
Increased visibility makes it easy for the authorities to identify oppositionists. For 
example, many of our interlocutors stated that dozens of ordinary citizens have 
been detained for a few days because of Facebook posts or “likes.” These individ-
uals, nevertheless, fear from publicize this information due to further persecutions 
by the government. Despite all their disadvantages, social media remain the only 
alternative source of information for oppositionists. Thanks to social media, the 
government lost monopoly over the flow of information and discussions, and eas-
ily became the target of widening public criticism. This social network seriously 
undermined the government propaganda and worsened its acceptance by the gen-
eral public. Public statements of local officials and deputies became frequent tar-
gets and were ridiculed by these new active voices. The Azerbaijani authoritarian 
regime, which usually relays on fear and its exalted authority as its main tools to 
maintain power, started rapidly losing both.
Then entrance of a new segment of society, namely the youth organizations, 
into public and political life caught the government unprepared. The government 
had a decade long experience in dealing with its old rivals, that is, the traditional 
opposition. However, the critical voices of newly galvanized youth challenged 
the government with new discourses, different set of values and methods. This 
was the voice of the emerging social middle class. For a long period of time, 
the opposition in Azerbaijan was associated with poverty due to the longstand-
ing pressure of the government on public employees and private business to deny 
any contacts with the political opposition. While economic middle class, namely 
mid-level business, still tried to distant themselves form any kind of expression of 
discontent due to the fear of the government new mid-level, well-educated (often 
abroad) career professionals, on the contrary, became the face of newly emerg-
ing dissent and dissatisfaction. The government was caught completely off guard 
to face these new developments. The Republican Alternative civic movement 
(ReAl), recently became a party, emerged as the first established political group 
representing this new style opposition.
At last, Arab Spring of 2010 further fomented birth of new critical voices. The 
government, fearful of the events in Arab countries, introduced cosmetic plans to 
fight corruption. Ideas like ASAN Service, which significantly reduced mid-level 
corruption in various areas, were the first genuine responses of the government to 
these newly emerged existential threats to its unchallenged monopoly of power. 
Nevertheless, in 2010, the government still continued its plan to build a managed 
democracy. The parliamentary elections were held in the same year left the local 
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legislative body without a single member of real opposition for the first time since 
1990 (Heinrich 2011, p. 5). Yet activism of youth was still growing and continu-
ing to mobilize more young people to public life.
Then in early 2013 these new dynamics of the society found a chance to 
express themselves in an opposition to the politics of the governments. The death 
of a young conscript soldier in a non-combat situation and his photos shared on 
social network caused public outrage and a mass unauthorized protest in down-
town Baku was organized by youth activists. The government’s response to this 
activism was a large scale, unprecedented major crackdown launched against 
political opponents, civil society leaders, heads of local NGOs, and prominent 
human rights activists. In addition, prominent international donors were forced 
out of the country, legislation on donor’s activities was tightened, and criminal 
investigations against them were launched. Hundreds were arrested and jailed, 
many left the country. The same year President Aliyev was reelected for a third 
term in a criticized by the international community elections (OSCE 2013).
The crackdown effectively halted the possible democratization process. How-
ever, repressions were not the only response of the government. Confronted by 
a youth activism, the government employed various tactics to engage the former 
and to divert it from political involvement. Repeating the models and discourses 
in which youth activism were expressed while transforming their content were 
among the most eye-catching practices adopted by the authorities. Despite overall 
failure of democratization in Azerbaijan, youth activism did introduce some sig-
nificant and visible changes to Azerbaijani society. Moreover, in some instances, 
it forced the government to retract from its previous positions and took notice 
from public concerns. So the impact of this youth activism on the transformation 
of the society will be discussed further as the main point of this article.
Rise of the New Opposition
Failure of the opposition forces first in the 2003 presidential and then the 2005 
parliamentary elections made some especially foreign-educated Azerbaijani 
young people and new generation public figures arrive at the conclusion that the 
first and foremost challenge is to question the traditional values of the popula-
tion in order to promote democracy among the masses. For it was clear that the 
vast majority of Azerbaijanis was quite conservative in their lifestyle and beliefs. 
Under these circumstances, from this point of view, how could a reasonable per-
son expect any democratic changes in the government of the country? In short, 
Azerbaijanis were not democratic in their daily lives and in their attitudes; so, 
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why not change the people first? With this reasoning in mind, a few organizations 
were established with the goal of educating the Azerbaijani citizens and promot-
ing liberal-democratic values in the society.
One of the most important developments was the establishment of AYO led 
by Rasim Garaja, Azad Yashar, Hamid Herischi, and Murad Kohnagala (Garaja 
2018, p. 152). Although AYO was founded in 2001, it became popular with Alma 
Newspaper after 2006. The goal of AYO was to give a voice to young writers, 
also known as the Alatoran (Twilight) group, who rebelled against the estab-
lishment writers from the Union of Azerbaijani Writers (Azərbaycan Yazıçılar 
Birliyi—AYB) or, what they referred to as “the ministry of literature,” an organi-
zation founded in Soviet Azerbaijan (Qaraca 2018, p. 162). AYO attracted and 
popularized young writers such as Seymur Baycan, Ali Akbar, Gunel Movlud, 
and Akshin Yenisey. By fearlessly lynching the stereotypes and conservative 
backwardness of the society these young writers introduced new bold language 
to Azerbaijani literature as well. They raised quite contagious issues such as 
suppression of sexuality among young people, and, most importantly women 
by conservative attitudes of the society. Many of our interlocutors stated that 
AYO writers, especially Seymur Baycan and Ali Akbar heavily influenced their 
approach to traditional values and helped them to be more open-minded. Almost 
all of our interlocutors pointed out that they were conservative and nationalists in 
their early twenties but also by reading writers such as Baycan and Akbar they 
softened their positions on many issues and embraced many liberal values. In this 
regard, AYO members became liberal educators of the youth; they initiated criti-
cal approach and launched genuine a transformation process.
While it is extremely difficult to say how many people were affected by their 
writings, a reasonable guess, based on our interviews with Garaja, Baycan, Akbar, 
and many other social activists, can be around ten–fifteen thousand. It should be 
noted that these writers were popular in a narrow circle and they influenced a por-
tion of young people, mainly in Baku. Alatoran Journal (2004–2012) issued 18 
volumes and the circulation of each volume was around 500–1000. Rafig Tagi, 
one of the most popular and controversial members of AYO, was well-known for 
his sharp language and criticism of religion. He was arrested with the changes 
of inciting hatred for three years in 2006 but was released after a few months 
with presidential pardon. However, on 21 November, 2011 he was assassinated 
and died in a hospital after a few days (RWB 2011). In his autobiography, Rasim 
Garaja argues that with his assassination, many AYO members did not want to be 
associated with Tagi and AYO anymore. As a result, in its tenth year, AYO was 
dissolved (Garaja 2018, p. 182).
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In 2005, some groups of educated Azeri youth started to show the early signs 
of civic activity. One of these groups was Alumni Network—later referred to sim-
ply as AN Network, consisted of a few public figures such as Emin Milli, Khadija 
Ismayil, Rashad Shirin, Erkin Gadirli, and others. The idea of this group consist-
ing of individuals who mostly studied abroad, was that networking was better 
than hierarchical organization because while the latter could easily be destroyed if 
the government persecuted its leaders, the former lacks any hierarchical structure 
and therefore cannot be intimidated by the arrests of a few people. The Friedrich 
Naumann Stiftung under the direction of Arastun Orujlu, the country representa-
tive for Azerbaijan were organizing series of seminars on liberty, liberalism, and 
libertarianism where prominent libertarians and adherents of Austrian school such 
as Tom G. Palmer and Hans-Hermann Hoppe delivered lectures to select groups 
of Azerbaijani youth leaders. According to Ali Novruzov, one of our interlocutors 
and a member of now defunct OL! Movement, “anarcho-capitalist ideas derived 
from these seminars might have possibly influenced the thinking of Kapellhaus 
leaders and their concept of networking instead of organizing.” AN Network 
organized lectures known as Kapellhaus Lectures in German Lutheran church, 
which was under the auspicious of the German Embassy in Azerbaijan, in down-
town Baku.
On every Sunday, well-known public figures including lawyer Erkin Gadirli, 
culturologist Rahman Badalov, film director Ayaz Salayev, writer Chingiz Abdul-
layev, political scientist Eldar Namazov, composer Elmir Mirzoyev, and a few 
foreign scholars gave lectures to approximately one hundred people, most of 
whom were students. Lectures and discussions were dynamic and often touched 
compelling questions, which otherwise would be impossible to discuss in state 
institutions and universities. The most prominent lecturer, however, was Erkin 
Gadirli, a then respected law teacher at Baku State University and currently the 
secretary of foreign relations of ReAl Party, who sometimes attracted over three 
hundred people and talked about issues such as democracy, liberalism, rule of 
law, responsible government, and individual liberties, critical thinking and even 
Derrida’s deconstruction in his lectures. As Novruzov stated, many people, 
including him, attending the lectures either heard about these concepts for the 
first time in their lives or in case if they might had been familiar with some of 
these concepts were unaware of the meanings as well as theoretical and practi-
cal implications of them. For example, democracy, at best, was understood as a 
majoritarian system without any consideration to checks and balances, minority 
rights, and individual liberties. Novruzov pointed out that because the universi-
ties did not teach or create any opportunity for students to discuss public issues, 
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government policies as well as political theories, students were eager to partici-
pate in the Kapellhaus Lectures.
Nevertheless, in 2007 the German Embassy refused to allow the AN Network 
to use the place for public lectures. In our interview with Erkin Gadirli, he stated 
that the only logical reason behind this decision was the pressures of the Azerbai-
jani government on the German Embassy. Many students who participated in the 
Kapellhaus Lectures started to question the knowledge of their teachers at uni-
versities and demanded to discuss issues of public concern. Moreover, lecturers 
were becoming famous and it concerned the government. Gadirli and our other 
interlocutors apprised us that the Kapellhaus Lectures was an apropos environ-
ment for young people to establish different networks. They stated that the found-
ing members of Dalğa and OL! movements were also among those who regularly 
participated in these lectures.
Then the first active youth movement called Dalğa appeared on the stage in 
early 2005. The idea was initiated by a group of students from Azerbaijan State 
University of Economics (ASUE) with the purpose of promoting democratic 
values, civility, tolerance, and rule of law. The Declaration of the movement 
states that Dalğa “strongly rejects any kind of discrimination [and] believes in 
the importance of reevaluating all values that restrict freedom” (Dalğa 2005). 
According to our interlocutors, the first members of Dalğa were the students of 
Khagani Hass, an influential anarchist teacher at ASUE. The movement attracted 
attentions by extravagant public events such as walking barefoot in  downtown 
Baku. Furthermore, since the movement emphasized the necessity of self- 
reflection and questioning the authority of traditions, its members became (in)
famous for radically challenging the taboos of the society. They were advocating 
free love, which was and still is unacceptable for a conservative Azerbaijani soci-
ety. In this regard, while Dalğa gave a voice to some individuals, they only man-
aged to promote these libertarian values in a narrow circle of young people. There 
are allegations that after a few years of its establishment, Asim Mollazade, a pro-
government party leader and MP, gained ascendancy over the movement. Accord-
ing to our interlocutors, moderate activities of Dalğa after 2008 strengthened the 
credibility of these allegations.
In less than two weeks’ aftermath of the 2005 elections, on 17 November, 
eleven young friends discussed the possibility of establishing a new organiza-
tion because they felt obliged to contribute to their society. After a week, they 
set the goals of this hypothetical organization, which were to change the society 
by education, help young people to acquire democratic principles and learn about 
new ideas as well as to support the youth in their personal development ( Salamli 
2009). After a few months, on February 11, 2006 a new independent youth 
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movement OL! (Be!) was founded by twenty two friends. Quite interestingly, 
about half of the founding members were women, a rare characteristic of organi-
zations in Azerbaijan. Some of the founding members studied abroad, grew up in 
intellectual and opposition-minded families. For instance, Turgut and Ilkin broth-
ers were the sons of Isa Gambar, former acting president of Azerbaijan and the 
chairman of Musavat Party, and Vugar Salamli was their close relative; Adnan 
Hajizade’s father Hikmat Hajizade (PhD in physics) was the member of Musavat 
and the first ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia between 1992 and 1993; Ruslan 
Asadov, Rashadat Akhundov, and Ilkin Alisoy were also the sons of opposition-
minded individuals.
The three major principles of OL! were non-violence, tolerance, and moder-
nity. In order not be persecuted by the government, from the beginning, the move-
ment made clear that its aim was educative and it did not want to be affiliated 
with any political party (OL! FAQ 2006). If we take into consideration the fre-
quent government persecutions and unsolved assassination of Elmar Huseynov, 
who was the most famous critic of the government and the editor-in-chief of 
Monitor magazine, in March 2005, this approach of OL! Movement was under-
standable. Yet, its goal was political, that is, the realization of democracy in 
Azerbaijan. The Manifesto of the movement, for example, stated that the “active 
participation of youth in public life is one of the main conditions for building 
democracy and Civil Society” (OL! Manifesto 2006). As it is seen from the Mani-
festo of the movement, which promoted free-thinking, democratic values, justice, 
tolerance, and modernity among the other principles, the aim was to change tradi-
tional values of the Azerbaijani society in order to make it more receptive to lib-
eral democratic values. In his blog, Ruslan Asadov, one of the founding members 
of the movement, summarized the fundamental logic of OL! by simply stating 
that “it is important for the people to have democratic values for the establish-
ment of democratic institutions” (Asadov 2009).
During our interview with Rashadat Akhundov, another founding member of 
OL!, who would later leave the movement to create political Nida Civic Move-
ment, he emphasized three reasons behind the policy of non-engagement in poli-
tics. First, he stated that after the repressions of the opposition members, the best 
option for a newly created organization was to remain neutral in politics because 
even after the election of 2005, there was a serious threat to the government crit-
ics. Second, OL! members believed that since they start from the scratch, they do 
not have to choose any side. Third, from the early experiences of the failures of 
the opposition, OL! members were convinced that quality is more important that 
quantity and in order to create a strong civil society with firm democratic values, 
any serious organization had to educate the youth. This emphasis on the quality 
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can be seen in the membership procedures of the movement. Unlike other civic 
organizations, anybody could not be a member of OL! because the members 
believed that it was crucial for them to know “the applicant” for some time and 
be sure that that person share the values of the movement. Only with the recom-
mendations from a significant number of the existing members, a person could 
be accepted to the movement. Therefore, Akhundov added, “OL! was a club of a 
narrow circle rather than a youth movement,” and as a result of this strict mem-
bership procedures, “I consider OL! the best and the most beneficial youth organ-
ization in the country.”
Between 2007 and 2009, OL! organized weekly lectures in the office of Amer-
ican Alumni Association concerning variety of subjects such as shortcomings 
of education in Azerbaijan, democratic values, and the role of European Institu-
tions in the transitional democracies. The lectures were popular among the Azeri 
youth and approximately a hundred people participated in each of them. In the 
early years, Yahoo groups were the main source for online communication among 
social activists in Azerbaijan and along with these groups, OL! members were 
also using their blogs, Facebook, and YouTube to spread their message.
Until 2008, young social activists tried to establish a dialogue with the govern-
ment bodies. For example, AN Network successfully persuaded the government to 
create a state scholarship program for young Azerbaijanis to study abroad. They 
gave a reference to the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (1918–1920) which, 
despite its financial challenges, sent a hundred students to study abroad. As a 
result of these activities, the state scholarship program was approved in 2007 and 
continued to benefit hundreds of young people till 2015. However, as Ali Novru-
zov highlighted in our interview, two events in the first half of 2008 “burned all 
bridges between the youth activism and the government.” First of these events 
was a terror attack by a Georgian citizen of Azerbaijani descent at the Azerbai-
jani State Oil Academy (ASOA) on 30 April, 2008. After the shooting which 
left 13 people dead and 10 people injured, the government did neither declare a 
national day of mourning, nor cancel the Flower Day, a national holiday on 10 
May celebrating the birthday of the late president Heydar Aliyev—the father of 
the incumbent president (Mehtiyeva 2009). After less than two weeks of the terror 
act in central Baku, while the government was celebrating the Flower Day, some 
social activists and bloggers wanted to place red carnations, the symbol of mourn-
ing in Azerbaijan, in front of the ASOA. However, they were stopped and detained 
without any explanation (OL! Media 2009; OL! Blog 2009). This approach of the 
government was perceived as a lack of respect to the victims of the terrorist act 
and severely damaged any opportunity for future cooperation between the civil 
society, particularly the youth organizations and the authorities.
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The second and the most important case was the arrest of two video bloggers, 
Emin Milli and Adnan Hajizade. Milli had created first online TV (AN TV) in 
Azerbaijan. He had approximately three thousand followers in Facebook and each 
of his videos in YouTube had up to a thousand viewers. Milli organized a demon-
stration with around two hundred people in front of the UN Headquarter in New 
York against the constitutional changes in Azerbaijan. In addition, he met with 
German MPs and criticized the Azerbaijani government for its anti-democratic 
actions. On the other hand, in one satirical YouTube video, mocking the govern-
ment purchase of 34 donkeys for about 180,000 US$ from Europe, Adnan Haji-
zade depicted a “German donkey” which was grateful to Azerbaijanis for their 
warm welcome. In the press conference, donkey-costumed Hajizade explains to 
journalists that unlike Europe, Azerbaijan provides more opportunities to don-
keys because in Azerbaijan you can achieve everything just by being a donkey 
(OL! Media 2008). After a week, Adnan and Emin Milli were attacked in a res-
taurant. They reported the attack to the police but instead they were arrested with 
hooliganism charges and later sentenced to imprisonment for two and two and a 
half years, accordingly (IRFS 2009; ESI 2011, p. 16–24). In our interview, inves-
tigative journalist Khadija Ismayil stated that Milli was arrested because of his 
activism abroad; however, Hajizade was not very popular and the only logical 
explanation is that the authorities believed that the “donkey” in the video sati-
rized President Ilham Aliyev. Although it was a satirical video mildly criticizing 
the government, Rashadat Akhundov told us in an interview, the government per-
ceived this satire as a threat. He added that Adnan and Emin were not opposition 
leaders but they could become one in the future; they were undermining the sym-
bolic legitimacy of the government by criticizing the traditional values, which the 
Azerbaijani authorities often use to justify their actions (see also Milli 2009).
The arrest of two social activists also influenced other youth outside OL! 
and AN Network. One of the groups that abated its political activities due to the 
expected persecution of its members was Müsbət Dəyişiklik (Positive Change), 
a political campaign team of Bakhtiyar Hajiyev in the 2010 parliamentary elec-
tions. In an email correspondence, Hajiyev wrote that the volunteers of his cam-
paign team were forced either to join pro-government İrəli Youth Movement or 
they would face persecution like Hajizade and Milli. In order to avoid this out-
come and appease the fears of young activists, he chose to educate young people 
and promote critical thinking among them. Nevertheless, Hajiyev was arrested for 
two years in March 2011 but conditionally released after a year.
Despite the arrest of one of their crucial figures, OL! Movement continued 
its usual activities. As a logical consequence of the activities aimed at creating 
an alternative space for students and all young citizens to discuss the issues of 
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public concern, OL! Movement launched Free Thought University (AFU) in 
October, 2009. To some extent, AFU became a game changer in the society and 
in a very short period of time gained enormous success and popularity among 
the youth. Indeed, it was an enlightening mission to educate the youth about 
issues such as democratic values, civil and minority rights, freedom of expres-
sion, gender issues, and others. Moreover, the youth was acquainted with a new 
generation of public figures, including Hikmat Hajizade, Aghalar Mammadov, 
Gubad  Ibadoglu, Eldar Namazov, Erkin Gadirli, Ilgar Mammadov, and Khadija 
Ismayil, who otherwise were denied access to the government-controlled media 
outlets for political reasons as well as internationally renowned figures such as 
Princeton Professor Michael A. Reynolds, journalist Thomas de Wall, employees 
of the US Smithsonian Museum, and the United States Ambassador to Azerbaijan 
Matthew James Bryza (AFU 2013). AFU organized interactive discussions, lec-
tures or seminars twice a week about democracy, freedom, rule of law, political 
ideologies, journalism, Arab Spring among many others. Until its closure by the 
government in April, 2013, AFU held over three hundred events with participa-
tion of more than four thousand people (Muradova 2013).
During our interview with Vugar Salamli, he highlighted that although OL! 
Movement and its project AFU were not affiliated with any political organization, 
the Azerbaijani authorities perceived them as a threat. In this respect, he contin-
ued, it became clear that even a “free university” constituted a threat for the gov-
ernment. The reason behind the closure of AFU, Salamli and Akhundov pointed 
out, might be the assumption that many young people became active in some 
social as well as political organizations such as Dalğa, Nida and ReAl. In a way, 
the government perceived AFU as a recruitment tool for the opposition groups.
The youth movements became popular for many reasons. First, the continuing 
failure of traditional opposition parties and their ideological bankruptcy increased 
the popularity of the youth movements. These opposition parties did not make 
any changes in the leaderships or ideologies. For example, Ali Karimli, who was 
the deputy chairman of the PFP, succeeded late Elchibey in 2000 and still leads 
the party. Similarly, Isa Gambar was the chairman of Musavat Party from 1992 
until 2014 and he was also succeeded by his deputy chairman Arif Hacili. Still 
these parties were promoting ethnic nationalism, Turanism, and conservatism. In 
other words, Azerbaijani opposition political parties were still using the national-
istic language of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, this old rhetoric was 
not attractive for those young people who were exposed to various new ideologies 
through online media, their educational backgrounds, and the social activism of 
the youth movements in general.
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The second reason was that the youth movements appealed to new social 
layer, which traditionally had been loyal to the government. This feature distin-
guished the youth movements from the traditional opposition and contributed to 
the rising fear of the government. As Francis Fukuyama states when the num-
ber of social middle class (educated individuals with a property and an occupa-
tional status) is small, that is, less than 30% of the general population, it supports 
authoritarianism (Fukuyama 2014, p. 419–420). The social middle class views the 
masses as a threat which would ultimately demand an economic distribution if 
seizes the power. Similarly, in Azerbaijan, this social middle class perceived old 
opposition as a representative of deprived classes which was seeking economic 
redistribution. As a result of this attitude and fear, the members of this class were 
either apolitical or supporters of the ruling party. However, on the contrary, the 
youth movement was regarded as a representative of this social middle class, and 
the government understood that this movement had a potential to mobilize the 
middle class against the government. Therefore, the government did its best to 
destroy this genuine rise of the local youth in order to prevent them from promot-
ing free thinking among the social middle class citizens.
The Impact
The impact of the youth was multidimensional. In politics it returned discussions 
over ideologies and to some extent changed monotone discussions around ethnic 
identity. It created very small number liberal-minded youth. It also revived the 
left, which seemed dead after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Young intellec-
tuals managed to rise genuine interest in Eurocentric left and American way of 
liberalism. The youth found out more about classic liberal ideas and authors like 
David Smith, Karl Popper, Milton Friedman, Slavoj Žižek became known in a 
narrow circle. Interest in philosophy promoted by western or Turkish educated 
youth seriously challenged irrelevant attitude towards philosophy caused by bor-
ing soviet teachings of this field.
One of the main revelations was the fact that secular traditions did not fade 
away with the fall of the Soviet Union. Indeed, secularism even attracted fol-
lowers among younger generations. Through 1990s and early 2000s, while 
traditional secular opposition failed to achieve its goals and the government con-
tinued to squeeze public sphere for independent voices as well as destroy demo-
cratic institutions such as free media and independent judiciary, there was a fear 
of rising Islam. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, some people expected that 
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religiosity and political Islam will replace the seculars as the main alternative to 
the authoritarian regime. However, the case of Rafig Tagi gave us enough reason 
to assume that it was a doubtful conclusion. The assassination of AYO member 
Rafig Tagi, still unresolved, caused serious standoff between seculars and reli-
gious activists. Tagi was the fiercest critics of Islam and attracted religious proc-
lamation from Iranian ayatollahs who condemned his writings. The refusal by the 
religious leaders of Azerbaijan to rise for 1 min silence to commemorate Tagi’s 
memory caused an outrage among secular writers and journalists as well as secu-
lar public. In fact, vocal religious activists were silenced by the public outrage 
fomented by secular writers and journalists.
This youth awakening initiated some visible changes in general culture and 
behavior as well. In a conservative Azerbaijani society, it was rear to see young men 
and woman socializing together in public sphere like coffee houses or chaykhana. 
However, this awakening of youth activists, which called themselves Public  Sektor 
(consisted of opposition-minded individuals), changed this tradition and popu-
larized this attitude at least in downtown Baku. Activist women broke taboos and 
started going to chaykhanas (local traditional coffee houses) alone or with men. 
This attempt to the emancipation of women even popularized western style parties 
among a narrow circle of youth. Until then in Azerbaijan, a common way of going 
to restaurants was to go to private cabins. Currently attending public venues became 
a trend in downtown areas of Baku and youth activism described above significantly 
contributed to this relatively new development. Discussions over shorts for men, 
which were quite unusual and unappreciated by local people and officials, caused 
long discussions as well. Although still the vast majority of Azerbaijani men prefer 
trousers in hot summer days, at least discrimination against those wearing shorts 
has been diminished over the years. While it is hard to elaborate the reasons behind 
these changing attitudes of the people, it is clear that public discussions initiated by 
the activist youth played a significant role in this transformation.
Youth private theaters like Oda (Room) and Əsa (Stick) (this one included 
disabled individuals as actors) were among the most successful initiatives. For-
gotten cinemas and theatres, which became obscure after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, were popularized once more by the youth activism. “Sing for Democracy” 
and “Art or Democracy” campaigns launched by human rights activist Rasul 
Jafarov used music and art to turn attention to human rights abuses in Azerbaijan 
(ESI 2015). The first campaign even managed to attract Swedish singer Loreen, 
the winner of the Eurovision Song Contest held in Baku in 2012, who met with 
Jafarov and supported his cause (HRW 2012).
One of the main impacts was the changing attitude of the public with regards 
to females who decided to study abroad. Until the early 2000s, families usually 
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did not consider this option at all because marriage of these girls in the future 
could be problematic due to the negative attitude of the public towards females 
who lived abroad alone. However, the emphasis of the youth activists on personal 
development and education, especially the state scholarship program which was 
accepted as a result of the youth activism normalized the view that girls too can 
study abroad.
In traditional Azerbaijani society, historically youth remained materially 
dependent on their families long after graduating from schools or universities. 
During this activation, however, the idea of leaving families became a new phe-
nomenon. In a sense, activism contributed to the independence of youth as well. 
Moreover, the era of internet and mobile phones contributed to the rise of author-
ity of Azerbaijani youth in their traditional and conservative families. Generally, 
old and mid age generation of Azerbaijanis were to slow to adapt to the new era 
of electronics and became dependent on the knowledge of youth. Furthermore, in 
a country where public sphere, television stations, and radios are under strict con-
trol of the oppressive government, the youth increased their influence in families 
due to their better access to alternative information via internet and technologies. 
Young people became primary information and knowledge holders in the tradi-
tional society. Youth also developed into the most active segment of the society in 
regard with political and social activism.
The most important achievement of the youth activism, in our view, was that 
the government eventually opened up some space for independent activity of the 
youth in one of the central districts of downtown Baku. Flourishing cafes and 
bars with live jazz music, theaters, and book stores created a vibrant life in the 
city center. Lured by the government or not, the majority of these small enter-
prises are launched by the active youth who one way or another were participants 
of the aforementioned independent or opposition minded organizations.
The Reaction of the Government
The government reaction to these activities of youth was multidimensional. There 
is no doubt that imprisonment and various kinds of intimidation were the primary 
tools employed by the oppressive, authoritarian regime. However, it seems the 
government understood that by oppression alone it would be very difficult to con-
tain the whole process for a long time. In this regard, the most interesting fact was 
that among the other oppressive measures, the government hijacked this trend of 
youth activism by accepting methods and external appearances of these initiatives 
such as seminars and public talks while denying or neutralizing its content.
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There are many cases which can prove the statement above. For example, in 
order to attract youth and to prevent them from joining aforementioned opposi-
tion and independent youth activism the government promoted İrəli (Forward) 
Youth Movement which was the continuation of the so-called National Council 
of Youth Organizations (NCYO), a pro-government group that operated since 
mid-1990s and successfully mobilized youth behind the ruling party. And the 
idea of İrəli was initiated by the NCYO as well. With the initiative of the NCYO, 
National Youth day was created and annually commemorated by the government. 
Some activists of this organization reached high government positions: the best 
examples would be Intigam Aliyev, who became the deputy of the Minister of the 
Youth and Sport; Elnur Aslanov, who was appointed to lead one of the branches 
of the Presidential Administration; Elshad Iganderov, who was appointed the head 
of the Committee for Work with Religious Associations; Farhad Mehdiyev, who 
was appointed the head of The Center for Strategic Studies under the President of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan; Azay Guliyev, who was appointed as head of the gov-
ernment ministry responsible for work with the non-government organizations.
Under patronage of Elnur Aslanov, İrəli started to rise as a result of some 
attractive projects. Another interesting fact about İrəli was that some of its activ-
ists, including the head of the organization Jeyhun Osmanli, were graduates of 
Gülen schools. However, it seems that despite spending lots of funds for its pro-
jects and initiatives, İrəli was failing to compete with the independent youth ini-
tiatives. And in 2014, for still debated reasons the government’s favor towards 
İrəli suddenly and drastically changed. Elnur Aslanov and Elshad Iganderov were 
fired. Suddenly İrəli became an obscure organization. Moreover, Rauf Mardi-
yev, the chairman of İrəli between 2012 and 2014, moved to the United States. 
It is assumed that after the destruction of all independent youth movements, the 
government did not need İrəli anymore. Since then the government started to 
strengthen the ruling party’s youth branch and the so called Student Unions in the 
universities which operate as unofficial branches of the ruling party.
However, the most important initiative of the government to attract youth 
became Yarat (Create) project, which is directly connected to the ruling family. 
There is no doubt that with more access to the government funds, Yarat proved to 
be more successful and attractive in comparison with İrəli. The main advantage 
of Yarat was its connection to the ruling family and as such the career opportuni-
ties it could provide, material incentives and glamour appeased the elitist desires 
of Azerbaijani youth. Elitism, despite its negative connotations, has always been 
driving force behind many changes in Azerbaijani society. The most interesting 
episode in Yarat’s activities was the fact that in some instances in order to attract 
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young people, it employed both appearances and narratives of independent and 
oppositional organizations it competed with. For instance, in one of the public 
lectures, which was organized by Yarat in style of AFU, the former used logos of 
the latter while designing promotional videos of its own lectures.
Even more interesting was the joining of Yarat to public opposition against 
some of the government policies. For example, in 2014, the government 
destroyed one of the historical districts in downtown Baku called “Sovetski” 
(built before the Soviet times during the first oil boom at the turn of the twentieth 
century) to clear space for its construction projects. Yarat held several expositions 
about this place in European capitals (Azertac 2014). In addition, the patron of 
Yarat Nargiz Pashayeva, who is sister of the first lady, signed a petition denounc-
ing the destruction of historical buildings in Baku (Miq 2016). Eventually, despite 
the complete destruction of Sovetski district, the government decided to carry out 
restoration works in another historical district of Baku which currently hosts the 
vibrant youth life and enterprises discussed above. There were some other activi-
ties of Yarat with similar connotations, such as exhibitions called “300 words or 
resistance” (Trend 2016) an exhibition held in Heydar Aliyev Center, named after 
the late president and father of current president of Azerbaijan, about imprisoned 
poets around the world (Tripathi 2018) while the Azeri government itself has 
arrested several poets throughout years.
In some other cases, the protests force the government to dismiss some high 
ranking officials. For instance, after a few months of youth protests against 
non-combat death of conscripts in 2013, defense minister Safar Abiyev was dis-
missed in October of the same year (Sumerinli 2013). Moreover, head of the 
executive power of Ismayilli district was dismissed after the riots in that region 
(Geybullayeva 2013).
As it was mentioned above, one of the methods employed by the government 
was luring opposition-minded activists with material incentives. A prominent 
viner Huseyn Azizioglu, who ridiculed with some local traditions and officials in 
his highly popular short satiric videos, switched sides. Although after this drastic 
turnaround he lost his popularity among the opposition-minded individuals, he is 
still popular among the young people at large. Murad Kohnagala, one of the four 
founders of AYO, later became a fierce critic of the opposition and the Western 
countries. He met with Anar Rzayev, the chairman of AYB, to confess that he was 
wrong about him. Also, he wrote a letter to President Ilham Aliyev in order to 
receive a free apartment from the government (Böyükçöl 2016; Telamnqızı 2017). 
Another AYO member, Aqshin Yenisey, who was known as a critic of the gov-
ernment and AYB, became an editor of the pro-government website 1937.az and 
the online channel APA TV (Qafqazinfo 2013; Modern 2015). And Qan Turalı, 
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one of the leading figures of AYO, was “neutralized” after he started to work with 
Kulis.az, a pro-government website, and due to this “switch”, he was criticized 
by his colleagues Seymur Baycan and Elnur Astanbayli (Danyeri 2011; Elitar.
info 2013). One of the most interesting cases in this regard was the case of inclu-
sive Əsa (“Handstick”) theatre. In a time when theatres completely lost popular-
ity after the fall of the USSR, creation of private theatres was one of the most 
interesting engagements of active youth. This initiative of the youth forced the 
government to pay more attention to the popularization of the state theatres as 
competitors for new youth interests. And in general, the government was quite 
successful in achieving its goals. Theatre attendance rose sharply. Moreover, the 
Əsa theater, which was known for its critical approach to the authoritarian rule 
and conservative backward traits of the society and which managed to attract pub-
lic attention to the problems of the persons with disabilities, eventually switched 
sides and accepted the patronage of the government; thus, opened its ways to the 
stages of the state theatres.
Another initiative of the government was to create an impression that it 
brings the open-minded youth to the administration. Several young people were 
appointed to ministerial positions or other high ranking positions in Presidential 
Administration, mainly as aides and counsellors of vice-president and the first 
lady Mehriban Aliyeva.
However, we should sadly note that general political environment, that is, the 
lack of public sphere for open public and political discussions and rampant cor-
ruption forced many youths to leave Azerbaijan and seek better conditions in 
other countries. Brain drain became a very serious issue which we guess will be 
felt in midterm perspective. Compared to the years discussed in this article, in 
the last few years, the activism of the new opposition declined sharply. Many of 
the key figures left the country and the government repressions created a general 
despair. In a sense, the new opposition was forced to start from the scratch. Due 
to the current stagnation among the young people in terms of social and political 
activism, it is difficult to predict future developments within the new opposition.
In late 2014, sharp decline in fuel prices caused the deep crisis in Azerbaijani 
economy, which is heavily dependent on the oil exports. The national currency 
was devaluated twice in 2015, dozens of banks failed (U.S. Department of State 
2018). This crisis also boosted the activism to certain extent and forced the gov-
ernment to announce multiple development programs and its intention to concen-
trate efforts on the diversification of economy. Nevertheless, only minor changes 
followed these declarations and major liberalization of economy has yet to be 
happened. The only filed where some real positive changes have been imple-
mented was the tourism industry. As a result of them, the country witnessed big 
47Halted Democracy: Government Hijacking of the New Opposition …
flow of tourists in comparison with the previous years. Moreover, it seems that 
current rebound in oil prices raised the confidence of the government.
In 2018 there were another presidential elections and incumbent Aliyev was 
elected for the fourth term and according to the latest changes to the Constitu-
tion, president’s term in office extended from five to seven years. However, the 
Armenian Velvet Revolution created serious discomfort for increasingly authori-
tarian regime in Azerbaijan. For despite the enmity between two countries, Azer-
baijani social media users were expressing their respect to the Armenian people in 
their successful attempt of overthrowing Armenian anti-democratic government 
and the Azerbaijani authorities feared that democratic developments in the neigh-
boring country can be an inspiration for Azerbaijanis. In addition, strengthening 
political Shia Islam in the country along with continuing discontent in the society 
adds to the unpredictability of future developments.
Discussion
The referendum of 2009 which lifted the two term limit on presidential power 
was another milestone in transformation of Azerbaijan into a consolidated 
authoritarianism. However, the next few years the government faced the youth 
movement which attracted sympathies of middle class and, thus, had a potential 
to revert the “gains” of the government. Yet, the authorities resorted to unprec-
edented large scale repressions, which halted the potential transformation. Sub-
sequently, in 2016, the government held another referendum that extended 
presidential years in power from 5 to 7 years. Moreover, this referendum intro-
duced new positions of vice-presidents in the hierarchy of the state administration 
and the president appointed his spouse the first vice-president. It seems that the 
republic has successfully been transformed into an informal monarchy.
Seeking options for immigration one way or another became an emerging 
trend as a response of youth to this tightening of regime. The rise of secular intel-
lectual youth was replaced with its exodus. Unfortunately, the destruction of this 
genuine youth awakening by repressions to some extent re-opened the frighten-
ing possibilities for political Islam to replace the secular-democratic forces as the 
main alternative to Azerbaijani authoritarianism.
Still, the youth movement did stimulate some minor positive changes. It 
forced the government to adjust its policies and to appease the discontent 
of youth by applying some cosmetic as well as genuine changes and open-
ing up some space for the youth activities. One of the most important achieve-
ments of the youth movement was that under the pressure of youth awakening 
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the government eventually responded to the public concerns and significantly 
reduced wide-spread bribery practices in universities where these practices flour-
ished for decades. We also conclude that the youth movement has genuinely 
contributed to cultural modernization by questioning some conservative traits 
and taboos of the society. It stimulated some positive trends, including revival of 
interest in reading and, thus, contributed to the re-birth of publishing, translation, 
and bookseller businesses. In addition, it seems that the repressions which were 
extensively covered in international media and seriously damaged the image of 
Azerbaijani authorities in the international arena have also forced the authorities 
to seek alternative ways of re-engagement with the Western powers in order to 
soften the possible repercussions of its heavy-handed domestic policies.
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that during the short period between the 
awakening and the repressions the impact of the youth movement was limited in 
scope, and it mobilized relatively small portion of the general population. Even 
AFU, which was the most popular place for public discussions, attracted just four 
thousand new people in four years and a small part of those participants became 
socially or politically active. Yet, indeed, within this Public Sektor young activists 
became the driving force and the new faces of resistance.
Finally, the new opposition was not free from its own serious shortcomings. 
Youth activists were too unprepared and unexperienced to succeed in promotion 
of democratic values. One of the most crucial deficiencies of the new opposition 
was the lack of ideological unity. Newly established youth movements did nei-
ther accept any ideology, nor successfully managed to teach political ideologies 
in depth to young people. In some cases, respected representatives of the Sektor 
demonstrated disappointing inconsistency and controversy. The lack of respect 
and tolerance of the new opposition members towards “others” as well as their 
refusal to increase their expertise in the matters they vowed to promote have also 
negatively impacted many positive contributions of the new opposition.
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